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REVIEW: ARE WE ‘CONTRACTING OUT’ 
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Introduction
Are Canada’s university campuses a “Charter-free” zone?1 Do students and faculty 
enjoy rights of free speech that may not be taken away at the whim of university 
administrations? More importantly, should they have such rights?
These questions arose again during the recent controversy at Concordia 
University in Montreal, where a moratorium on discussion of the Middle East was 
imposed after protests surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict turned ugly. Similar 
questions were the subject of substantial public debate during the 1997 APEC 
protests at the University of British Columbia, and the subsequent inquiry.2
At UBC, censorship arrived in rather dramatic fashion with guns and pepper 
spray; as a result of the direct involvement of the RCMP, there could be no doubt 
that the Charter was in play. More recent episodes such as that at Concordia remind 
us that censorship of students and others at universities more often takes a form far 
more ethereal and possibly more insidious.3 Is the bureaucratic crackdown at
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1 Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms, s. 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
21 disclose that, while a law student at UBC, I was arrested during the 1997 APEC protest and became 
a complainant before the RCMP Public Complaints Commission’s Inquiry. For a description of the 
APEC events see W. Wesley Pue, ed., Pepper in our Eyes: The Apec Affair (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2000). I have also acted as counsel in two of the episodes I later describe in this article (as I will indicate 
where appropriate), and have had, through various executive positions with the B.C. Civil Liberties 
Association, involvement with others.
3 My main concern here is with respect to out-of-classroom student speech as an element of academic 
freedom at universities. Certainly the academic freedom of professors and instructors is a serious issue, 
but it is bound up with traditional arguments regarding the role of the tenure system in protecting
Concordia an isolated incident? Is there perhaps a trend against free speech at our 
Universities?
It may be that the present degree of university censorship, as some will argue, 
is necessary for the maintenance of an open, dynamic and diverse learning 
environment. On the other hand, it might not be anything so modem and desirable 
at all, but instead a short-sighted reaction of those “[persons] of zeal” whom Louis 
Brandeis described as “well meaning but without understanding.”4 It could also be 
that the present situation is not the result of any real plan, benign or otherwise, but 
rather the result of an unprincipled process of ‘ muddling through’ without any of the 
(at least somewhat) clearer guidance that constitutional precedent might provide.
Today, with the APEC events almost 5 years behind us and the Charter o f Rights 
and Freedoms having reached 20 years of age, we might evaluate the state of 
freedom of speech within Canadian Universities. Is it better, worse, or the same? 
Does the Charter offer any protection for the students of Canada’s ‘independent’ 
educational institutions? Should it?
In this brief article, I discuss some of the more and less notorious recent cases 
of censorship at universities, in support of my subsequent argument that some 
limited constitutional protection of speech may be a prudent imposition upon the 
traditional autonomy of Canadian universities. I will briefly consider the series of 
halting decisions that seems to be dissuading plaintiffs from asserting these kinds of 
Charter challenges, and bolstering universities’ confidence that they can do as they 
please when regulating expressive conduct on campus.
A Few Anecdotal Reports
A. “Contract Censors”; Universities as Regulators o f Speech
If we accept that a high, if not unlimited, degree of freedom of expression is
academic rigour and freedom of inquiry. Students do not of course enjoy tenure, and indeed the penalty 
for engaging in forbidden protest, display or discussion may be summary expulsion.
4 Olmstead v. US, 277 U.S. 438 at 479 (1928).
fundamental to the creation of an adequate post-secondary learning environment,5 
then we would — and should — be disappointed when measures are taken by 
universities, generally asserting a right to use their own property as they wish, to 
suppress traditionally protected speech, either generally or (more often) based on its 
content.6
(i) Concordia University vs. Svend Robinson and Libby Davies
Perhaps the best-known recent example of university censorship is the 
aforementioned ban imposed by Concordia University in the wake of violent 
opposition to a speech by Israeli Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. There, 
protesters had asserted the most churlish form of censorship, creating a disturbance 
of such proportion that Mr. Netanyahu’s speech could not be given, nor could his 
safety be assured. The University’s response, however, was only slightly more 
enlightened. It simply imposed a broad ban on particular types of student 
communication (such as information display tables in the school’s mezzanine 
concourse), and then forbade any discussion of the “Middle East Issue” at all.
Parliamentarians Svend Robinson and Libby Davies proposed to give speeches 
on Middle East peace to challenge the ban; the university sought— and received— 
an injunction to prevent it. However, Concordia rescinded the broader policy of 
silence before it could be challenged in Court, while predictably never conceding 
that there was any question whether the restriction was constitutional.
J I assume here that the Canadian Association of University Teachers’ views on free speech are widely 
held by the Canadian public. The Association stated:
Academic freedom is essential for universities to fulfill their public responsibility to promote 
the unfettered search for knowledge and truth... Academic freedom means the right to freedom 
of speech and discussion, regardless of prescribed doctrine, political convention, or 
administrative convenience... Academic institutions have an obligation to defend academic 
freedom and not allow open discussion to be suppressed.
Canadian Association of University Teachers, “CAUT Statement on Freedom of Speech on Campus” 
(12 September 2002) online: <http://www.caut.ca/english/publications/news_releases/ 
20020912FreedomSpeech.asp>.
61 focus here on speech that is overtly concerned with political or social commentary.
A bizarre controversy began at Canada’s largest law school when an Osgoode 
student named Omar Siddiqui, who is an adherent of the Islamic faith, wrote a series 
of articles in the student paper Obiter Dicta on subjects including Shariah (Islamic) 
Law. His defence of many of the more controversial practices in some Islamic 
countries, such as the dismemberment of thieves and the stoning to death of 
allegedly adulterous women, eventually led to a riposte from another student, 
Demitry Papasotiriou. But the latter went well beyond simple criticisms of any 
particular legal rules. He wrote that “contrary to Mr Siddiqui's remarks, there is 
NOTHING, absolutely nothing spiritual about that Islamic faith,” which he described 
as “a protocol of social conduct, a hybrid if you will of the worst elements of 
communism and fascism co-existing in a monstrous symbiosis; of oppression and 
most pervasive and intolerable regulation.”7
In a letter to Obiter Dicta, Dean Peter W. Hogg denounced Papasotiriou’s 
article, and reminded “every member of the Osgoode community of our commitment 
to equality, which in this context means being respectful of the religious beliefs of 
fellow students.”8
It is of course one thing to accept that everyone has an obligation to respect 
another’s right to an opinion or belief. But should this be extended to impose an 
obligation to respect that opinion or belief itself, as Dean Hogg asserts? If so, what 
is left of criticism or debate? The Canadian Civil Liberties Association’s Alan 
Borovoy wrote to Dean Hogg that “[rjeligious beliefs, no less than philosophical 
theories and political doctrines, must be fair game for the challenges and criticisms 
of university students.” This is an expression o f principle with which few Canadians, 
in my opinion, would find fault. Nevertheless, the University pressed ahead with 
disciplinary action against Papasotiriou for violation of its speech code.9
It may be that Mr. Papasotiriou expressed his views in an unnecessarily strident
7 Demitry Papasotiriou, “In Allah We Trust” The Obiter (12 March 2001), online: 
<http://www.yorku.ca/obiter>.
8 Peter W. Hogg, Letter to the Editors, The Obiter (19 March 2001), online: 
<http://www.yorku.ca/obiter>.
9 “‘Offensive’ student article: Civil Liberties group says religion should be ‘fair game’” The National 
Post ( 11 June 2001 ). I have been unable to determine, either from published sources or from colleagues 
at Osgoode, the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings, if in fact they concluded.
way. He clearly has strong views regarding the foundational principles of Islam, as 
well as their legal manifestations. But consider what would happen if similar 
criticisms were focused upon, for instance, Christianity? I haven’t searched to see 
whether anyone has described the teachings of the Catholic Church, for instance, as 
“a hybrid . . . of the worst elements of communism and fascism co-existing in a 
monstrous symbiosis; of oppression and most pervasive and intolerable regulation” 
but I would be surprised if some Marxist scholar or admired activist had not used 
terms at least as critical as these.10
Of course, the pat answer is that Muslims are particularly vulnerable in a way 
that Catholics are not. This is possible,11 but adopting such an analysis will require 
us to rank groups (and to assign expression rights) by degrees of victimization. This 
is no small challenge. Mr. Siddiqui’s comment, for instance, that it was just to stone 
adulterous women to death (providing that it could be shown that they were 
adulterous) could easily be interpreted as intolerant, and even hurtful, speech 
directed at women.12 Meanwhile, other statements that might cause offence, such as 
those particularly critical of American foreign policy, are vigorously defended by the 
academic community.13 At the very least, one should be concerned that Dean Hogg, 
by some distance the most respected constitutional scholar in Canada, apparently 
attached so little importance to Mr. Papasotiriou’s right to speak his views, and by 
implication so much to Mr. Siddiqui’s.
The question here is not whether the speech involved transgresses the Criminal 
Code or provincial human rights legislation. If such an allegation is made, then it can
10 Ironically, Mr. Siddiqui, himself the “victim” of Mr. Papasotiriou’s statements, was not averse to 
comparing the beliefs and actions of others to those of Hitler and Stalin: Omar Siddiqui, “Living in 
Fear”, Obiter Dicta (9 September 2002), online: <http://www.yorku.ca/obiter>.
11 Though campus crackdowns against mostly-Catholic anti-abortion groups suggest that there might be 
considerably vulnerability there as well, as I will discuss.
12 Certainly one columnist seemed to think that Siddiqui’s stated views could “jeopardize my freedom 
and safety if they were implemented in this country”: Licia Corbella, “Intolerant of Oppression” Calgary 
Sun (6 May 2001).
13 Consider the controversial statement of UBC professor Sunera Thobani in the wake of the 9/11 attacks 
that “the path of U.S. foreign policy is soaked in blood”. See Sunera Thobani, “War Frenzy” online: 
September 11th Fallout Page <http://www.kersplebedeb.com.>. Now replace “U.S. foreign policy” with 
something like “the policy of Islamic regimes” and you begin to see the conundrum. For the various 
reactions to Thobani’s words (from complaints to the RCMP of a ‘hate crime’ to Thobani’s defenders 
in academia) see Glen Bohn & Kim Bolan, ‘Thobani accused of hate crime against Americans; 
Complaint sent to Ottawa police ‘pure harassment’, UBC professor says” The Vancouver Sun (10 
October 2001).
be prosecuted and adjudicated in light of section 1 of the Charter. The question is 
whether a university should be able to implement regulations on offensive speech 
that are more restrictive than those which apply elsewhere in society, and if so, why?
B. “Sub-Contractors”: The Disappointing Record o f Student Government
As troubling as university censorship of students can be, the most enthusiastic 
censors are ironically turning out to be students themselves, acting through the 
delegated authority enjoyed by student governments. As private corporate entities 
recognized by universities but ‘ independent’ from them, these organizations are able 
to exploit a rather extraordinary degree of power and immunity from effective 
review.
Student governments, legally at arm’s length from the University itself (but 
tasked with broad authority on university campuses) tend to attract into their ranks 
well meaning and committed social activists. Unfortunately, though, such levels of 
energy and commitment to public service have the tendency to crowd from one’s 
mind the idea that power over minority opinion must be exercised with restraint.
(i) Concordia Students Union vs. Hillel
It is to me infinitely regrettable that the majority of efforts to censor opinions on 
campus come from those who profess to be ‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ in other areas. 
These groups have proven themselves able to develop a dogmatic canon of beliefs 
on a range of issues, and woe betide those who dare dissent.
One of these received beliefs of mainstream campus activism concerns the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, and, deservedly or otherwise, is most frequently critical of Israeli 
government policy. At Concordia, as I mentioned, such activists led a riotous 
opposition to Mr. Netanyahu’s speech. Of course, student activists also tend to 
participate most actively in student government. It was therefore little surprise to 
some that, a few weeks after the aborted presentation, the Concordia Student Union 
took measures to ban the University’s chapter of Hillel, a Jewish students’ group, 
purportedly for distributing recruiting literature of the Israeli army’s “Mahal” 
(foreign soldiers) program.
I have no informed opinion on Hillel’s views on the Middle East peace process, 
if indeed such a group can be attributed with a single set of views on such a vast
topic. But the reaction of the Student Union to the actions of a single person — a 
person who may or may not have been a Hillel member, let alone representative of 
the organization itself — appears to have been hasty and an overreaction.14 Indeed, 
one might suspect that the Union was looking for an opportunity to strike a blow, not 
against criminal activity, but rather against Hillel’s pro-Israeli stance, which appears 
to offend many student activists.15
When the latest controversy hit the fan, appeals were made for the University to 
order that the Student Union reinstate Hillel; the Student Union acceded that they 
would do so if the University requested it. However, calling the CSU’s overtures 
“inappropriate and self-serving”, the University declined to intervene.16
Of course, in barring Hillel, the CSU was not acting on behalf of the University, 
and Concordia’s refusal to intervene should not be seen as an endorsement of the 
Student Union’s position. I am not suggesting that Student Unions generally, or any 
one in particular, are “sub-contractors” in the sense that they routinely do the bidding 
of the university with respect to censorship. But both the university itself and the 
student government are institutions with interests that frequently coincide. Both may 
be unwilling to tolerate speech that tends to be disruptive or far outside the political 
or social mainstream, however that is defined. At times what is within the 
mainstream of student interest will diverge from the universities’, as with, for 
instance, tuition fee increases. With respect to particularly challenging and 
controversial issues, the views of the student bodies can be expected to coincide 
quite nicely with those of the university administration, as both might be happy if 
troublesome minorities just went away.
14 So hasty, in fact, that it resulted from a meeting of only 9 of the 27 Council members, conducted at 
midnight on the eve of exams, according to university Provost Jack Lightstone as reported in 
Concordia’s student newspaper. Hillel, incidently, denied that it had distributed the pamphlet at all: 
Steven Faguy, “Concordia distances itself from Hillel suspension” The Link (6 January 2003), online: 
<http://thelink.concordia.ca/breakingnews/02/12/06/2355243.shtml>.
15 B’nai Brith accuses the Concordia Student Union of conducting a campaign against Hillel, suggesting 
that the Union participated in the anti-Netanyahu riot of September 19: see Marvin Kurz, “It’s good to 
be a Jew in Canada” The Globe and Mail (8 January 2003) A13. The Student Union denies that 
anything apart from the recruitment was at issue in the “suspension” of Hillel’s funding: Yves Engler, 
“Union not to blame” The Globe and Mail (10 January 2003) A 10. In fairness to the CSU, it must be 
pointed out that it had attempted to support the expression rights of both sides, and in fact was 
responsible for inviting Mr. Netanyahu to Concordia in the first place.
16 Statement of Provost Jack Lightstone, quoted in Faguy, supra note 14. Hillel was later reinstated at 
Concordia.
(ii) Anti-Abortion Protesters in British Columbia
In British Columbia, one of the few things most people agree upon is the right of a 
woman to have an abortion.17 Of course a minority opinion exists, and this opinion 
is often a result of devotion to a particular religious doctrine. In this province, 
therefore, small groups of (mostly Catholic, in my observation) students have 
attempted to form groups to petition their fellow students to reconsider their opinion 
on the abortion question.
At many, if not most universities, organized student activities desirous of using 
property administered by the student government must be created through formal 
subsidiary organizations of the students’ association, i.e. through officially 
sanctioned “clubs”. While this arrangement simplifies organizational tasks and 
liability insurance arrangements, it also gives the student government a rather unique 
authority over the constitution — and deconstitution — of student activist groups. 
This is an authority that has been, in my opinion, routinely abused.
At UBC, the Alma Mater Society (the student government) has conducted a 
campaign against the display by its resident anti-abortion groups of images that 
graphically compare abortion to incidents of historical atrocity such as the 
Holocaust. In one episode, the Society forced the removal from a display table of 
a photo album containing snapshots of such images; in another, the “Student 
Administrative Commission” (an executive body of the AMS) banned even the 
written mention of such materials from the Student Union Building. Refusal to 
follow such guidelines could result in the deconstitution of the club. In one notorious 
incident in November of 1999, three students (one was an elected member of the 
AMS Council; the other two were non-elected AMS “External Commissioners”) 
attacked and destroyed a display consisting in part of these “GAP” images.18
Elsewhere, opposition to student anti-abortion groups is focused even less on the 
medium than the message. At the University of Victoria in the Fall of 2000, the 
UVic Students’ Society (UVSS) determined that a poster by a club called “Youth 
Protecting Youth” (YPY) was in violation of the Society’s resolutions. The poster,
17 A recent poll suggested that two thirds of British Columbians supported a woman’s right to choose: 
“66% are pro-choice, poll finds” The Vancouver Sun (31 August 2000) Al.
18 “GAP” stands for Genocide Awareness Project; the juxtaposed images are produced by an American 
group called the Center for Bioethical Reform and distributed to anti-abortion activists in Canada and 
the US. I was counsel for several students in a lawsuit against the Alma Mater Society and the individual 
students involved; none of the facts I describe here are controversial in that case.
which the UVSS had initially approved for display, indicated only that there was no 
criminal law in Canada against abortion. The UVSS had two policies that bore on 
the issue. The first policy was that the UVSS was officially “pro choice”. The second 
was that no club could take a position opposed to an official UVSS policy. As a 
result, the UVSS Council met and deconstituted the YPY group, therefore depriving 
it of the legal right to conduct activities as a group on Campus. Only after 
considerable public controversy19 and the subsequent filing of a discrimination 
complaint with the Human Rights Commission20 did the UVSS relent and 
reconstitute the club.
Around that same time, at the University College of the Caribou, “Students for 
Life”, another anti-abortion club, set up an information table that featured biology- 
lab models of fetal development. The display was banned, and the gestational 
models confiscated by the UCC’s own Students’ Society because of complaints that 
some had found them “offensive.” A controversy erupted, with the student 
government debating for months whether the group should have the “right” to use 
the models in their anti-abortion work. In the Fall of 2000, the Students’ Society 
voted to deconstitute the Students For Life club, ostensibly because it had barred a 
student reporter from one of its meetings.21
Elsewhere in B.C., the forced removal of another anti-abortion display (in which 
small white crosses were set up on a lawn in numbers supposedly equivalent to those 
abortions performed in an average day) suggests that the censorship of anti-abortion 
activists is becoming systematic wherever complaints of offence are made.22
19 Stewart Bell, “Ousted Anti-abortion Group Complains” The National Post (26 October 2000) A7; T. 
O’Neill, “At B.C.’s universities, preachers of ‘tolerance’ are proving to be the most intolerant of all” 
Report Newsmagazine (13 March 2000).
201 represented two members of YPY in their complaint to the Commission.
21 I was involved with the Caribou controversy through my position with the B.C. Civil Liberties 
Association, and my knowledge is based upon conversations with some persons involved, including the 
University president. The events were reported in certain Christian publications, but apparently not 
elsewhere. See for instance: Karen Stiller, “Not a chicken or dragon in the bunch” The Interim 
(December 2000); and Jeff Dewsbury, “Civil liberties association speaks out on behalf of pro-life club” 
B.C. Christian News (October 2000), online: <http://www.canadianchristianity.com/cgi- 
bin/bc.cgi?bc/bccn/l 100/sibc.>.
22 Jennifer Feinberg, “Campus Abortion Display Gives Life to Complaints” The Chilliwack Progress 
( 1 March 2002) A1 ; Lisa Jorgensen, “Anti-abortion Display Removed, UCFV Students Upset by Policy” 
The (Abbotsford) Times (1 March 2002) 2.
Nor is there reason to believe that the lot of student anti-abortion groups is better 
in other provinces. Recently in Ontario, a “pro-life” presentation by a guest speaker 
at a meeting of Lambton College’s Christian Fellowship group was cancelled 
because the college feared that it would not be “balanced.”23 In another episode, the 
Ryerson Students’ Administrative Council (RyeSAC) refused official group status 
to the Ryerson University Choose Life Association, with RyeSAC president Darren 
Cooney expressing concern that materials distributed by the group — apparently 
including quotes from Mother Teresa on abortion — were “strongly worded.”24
These incidents raise a difficult issue: as problematic as the application of the 
Charter to universities is, students’ societies, which are private bodies legally 
distinct from even the University’s tenuous connections to government, seem 
immune altogether. Yet they control crucially important aspects of the university 
experience. Does their corporate status mean that students have no protection against 
them, or against a university that wished to ‘contract out’ to them its regulation of 
speech?
The Charter on Campus
A. Expression as an Element o f  a University Education
Universities are without a doubt a traditional forum for the discussion and debate of 
the most pressing and controversial social and political issues.25 They could be said, 
at least in part, to have been created or continued by governments for such purposes. 
The balancing of these various commitments can be achieved without undue strain, 
as American universities have found:
Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity of the University to 
establish reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Nor do we question the 
right of the University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce
23 The College claimed that its constitution forbids “events that provide a one-sided view of a political 
or religious issue,” according to news reports: Jack Poirier, “College cancels pro-life speaker: Decision 
opposed by some faculty and students” The Observer (Sarnia) (25 March 2003) A3.
24 Suzanne Ma, “Pro-life group still alive” The Eyeopener (18 March 2003) online: 
<http://www.theeyeopener.com/stoiydetail.cfm?storyid=523>.
25 A university campus, “at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public 
forum”: Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 at 267; 102 S. Ct. 269,273 n. 5 (1981).
resources or “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may 
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” Sweezy v. New  
H ampshire , 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); see 
University o f  California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312 -313 ( 1978) (opinion 
o f  POWELL, J., announcing the judgment o f the Court). Finally, we affirm the 
continuing validity o f cases, e. g., H ealy  v. James, 408 U.S., at 188-189, that 
recognize auniversity’s right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate 
reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity o f  other 
students to obtain an education.26
Earlier, the US Supreme Court had foreshadowed the ‘compatibility’ test 
adopted in Committee for the Commonwealth o f Canada with respect to universities:
The nature o f  a place, ‘the pattern o f its normal activities, dictate the kinds o f 
regulations o f time, place, and manner that are reasonable.’27
In RWDSUv. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., McIntyre J. considered the importance of 
free expression, inter alia, in educational institutions. He stresses the continuity with 
pre-Charter principles:
Freedom o f expression is ... one o f the fundamental concepts that has formed the 
basis for the historical development o f the ... educational institutions o f western 
society. Representative democracy, as we know it today, which is in great part the 
product o f free expression and discussion o f varying ideas, depends upon its 
maintenance and protection.28
This was reiterated in McKinney v. University o f Guelph,29 where Chief Justice 
Dickson and Justices La Forest and Gonthier described academic freedom as 
“essential to our continuance as a lively democracy.”30 In the Justices’ view, the sole 
“focus” of academic freedom, which “serves a vital role in the life of the university”,
26 Ibid. at 276-77.
27 Wright, ‘The Constitution on the Campus” (1969), 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027 at 1042, cited in Grayned 
v. City o f  Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 at 116 (1972).
28 RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 583.
29 McKinney v. University o f  Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
30 Ibid. at 286-87.
is to protect “against the censorship of ideas.”31
B. The University as a Government Actor: McKinney after Eldridge
The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to consider academic freedom or 
free speech as a Charter right, and the question remains open. The leading case 
considering the Charter's, application to universities, McKinney v. University o f  
Guelph, found that the university was, at least for the purposes of establishing 
mandatory retirement rules, an actor independent of government and thus immune 
from Charter.
However, the McKinney ratio was cobbled together from four sets of reasons. 
In fact, a majority of the Court considered that universities might indeed perform 
some functions that would be subject to Charter review.32 Nevertheless, McKinney 
arguably establishes a fairly strong presumption against the application of the 
Charter on university campuses.
McKinney did, however, provide for exceptions. Recently, in R. v. Whatcott,33 
the conviction of an anti-abortion protester for leafletting on the campus of the 
University of Regina was overturned on appeal to the Court of Queen’s Bench. In 
reaching this decision, Justice Ball considered the special role of free speech at a 
university:
The forum chosen by Mr. Whatcott to express his views was the University Campus, 
a locale one would expect to facilitate and encourage free and open intellectual 
discussions. W hether or not the purpose o f the Bylaw was to prohibit the distribution 
o f all written material or only advertising matter, its application to Mr. W hatcott’s 
activity was intended to, and clearly did, effectively stop him from communicating 
his views. As such, it infringed upon his freedom o f expression protected by s. 2(b) 
o f the Charter.34
31 Ibid. at 376.
32 Supra note 29 at 418 per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; 444 per Sopinka J.; and 371 -79 per Wilson and Cory 
JJ.
33 R. v. Whatcott, [2002] S.J. No. 599.
34 Ibid. at para 47.
Of course, it was difficult for the University of Regina in Whatcott to invoke the 
University of Guelph’s argument in McKinney (i.e., that it was not executing a 
governmental decision), because the University of Regina enjoyed a statutory 
authority to enact bylaws that were enforceable through the provincial courts in 
much the same way as a municipality’s are. As such, its position was closer to the 
defendant municipality in Ramsden v. City o f Peterborough,35 (where an anti- 
postering bylaw was struck down) than with the University of Guelph in McKinney.
There is a substantial question whether the shield offered to universities by 
McKinney could be said to have survived the Court’s subsequent decision in 
Eldridge v. British Columbia.36 There, the Court reconsidered the application of the 
Charter to private institutions implementing government programs. The Court found 
that the Charter applied, and that the administration of the programs in question (the 
provision of health care services in hospitals) must be non-discriminatory. Justice La 
Forest said at paras. 42 and 44 (emphases added):
It seems clear, then, that a private entity may be subject to the Charter in respect of 
certain inherently governmental actions... Just as governm ents are not perm itted  to 
escape C harter scrutiny by entering into comm ercial contracts o r  other “priva te  ” 
arrangements, they should not be a llow ed to evade their constitutional 
responsibilities by  delegating the implementation o fth e ir  po lic ies and program s to 
p riva te  entities. In M cKinney, I pointed to Slaight, supra, as an example o f a 
situation where action taken in furtherance o f  a government policy was held to fall 
within the ambit o f the Charter. I noted, at p. 265, that the arbitrator in that case was 
“part o f the governmental administrative machinery for effecting the specific 
purpose o f the statute.” "It w ould be strange, ” I  wrote, ‘‘i f  the legislature and the 
governm ent could  evade their Charter responsibility by  appointing a person to carry  
out the purposes o f  the statute  see idem.
... As the case law discussed above makes clear, the Charter may be found to apply 
to an entity on one o f two bases. First, it may be determined that the entity is itself 
“government” for the purposes o f s. 32. This involves an inquiry into whether the 
entity whose actions have given rise to the alleged Charter breach can, either by its 
very nature or in virtue o f the degree o f governmental control exercised over it, 
properly be characterized as “government” within the meaning o f s. 32(1). In such 
cases, all o f  the activities o f the entity will be subject to the Charter, regardless of 
whether the activity in which it is engaged could, if  performed by a non­
governmental actor, correctly be described as “private.” Second, an entity may be
35 Ramsden v. City o f  Peterborough, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084.
36 Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
found to attract C harter scrutiny with respect to a particular activity that can be 
ascribed to government. This demands an investigation not into the nature of the 
entity whose activity is impugned but rather into the nature of the activity itself. In 
such cases, in other words, one must scrutinize the quality o f  the act at issue, rather 
than the quality o f  the actor. I f  the act is truly "governm ental” in nature — fo r  
example, the im plem entation o f  a  specific statu tory scheme or a government 
program  — the entity perform ing it w ill be subject to review  under the Charter only 
in respect o f  that act, and  not its other, p riva te  activities.
Universities, while perhaps not government actors the majority of the time, are 
nevertheless places that owe their existence to governmental action. Their central 
function — the provision of university education and the conferral of degrees — is 
controlled by the government.37
Often they are established on government land granted free by the government, 
territory that is offered statutory protection against expropriation and taxation.38 
University land is not freely alienable; its use is governed by the purposes 
established by statute,39 which usually requires that it be used for university 
purposes.40 Is one of these purposes the fostering and protection of free speech? 
Certainly Justice Ball must be correct when he stated that a university is “a locale 
one would expect to facilitate and encourage free and open intellectual 
discussions.”41 One could certainly make the argument that this expectation might 
rise to the level of a contractual right, i.e., that the existence of reasonable freedom
37 Professor Hogg, pre-Eldridge, rejected the ‘public function’ test in favour of that of governmental 
control. However, even on this point, Hogg concedes that the central question is “whether the 
government has assumed control o f  the function", not simply the degree of state control over the 
institution: Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law o f  Canada 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 849-50 
(emphasis added).
38 With respect to UBC, see University Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 468, s. 54.
39 By way of example, the University of British Columbia is a university continued pursuant to the 
University Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 468, s. 3 et seq. That Act restricts sale of lease or land that does not 
conform with the terms of the grant of the land. In turn, the land upon which the University was built 
had been granted through the British Columbia University Site Act, 1918, S.B.C. 1918, c. 94. That Act 
permitted the Lieutenant Governor in Council to “grant to the University of British Columbia the said 
Lot 3044 for the purposes of a site for the said University.” This combination of legislation appears to 
restrict any statutory university land from being used for non-University purposes.
40 The University Act, ibid., describes a mandate to “generally, promote and carry on the work of a 
university in all its branches, through the cooperative effort of the board, senate and other constituent 
parts of the university.”
41 Supra note 33.
of expression is an implied term of the agreement between a university and the 
student.
Like the hospitals in Eldridge, Canadian universities, in providing education, are 
acting in furtherance of governmental policy as elucidated through statute. However 
much independence is granted to an institution in this country, the ability to confer 
University degrees is rigidly controlled by statute. Despite the recent relaxing of 
certain rules in Ontario42 and one or two anomalous US-afïïliate schools,43 there is 
as yet no ‘free market’ for degree-granting institutions in Canada. This appears to 
reflect a social choice to treat university education as a public, rather than private, 
function. While universities may do many things that are clearly private in nature, 
such as entering into the contract at issue in McKinney, the provision of a university 
education to students in itself is, in my view, a central public endeavour.
This argument is supported by the fact that, while the university does not usually 
exercise coercive government power in the traditional way, its authority is no less 
coercive. Over the last few decades, the successful completion of a university 
education has become a virtual prerequisite of successful careers in many, if not 
most, professions and trades. Indeed, when a professional school, such as Osgoode 
Hall in the Papasotiriou case discussed earlier44 considers expelling a student for his 
speech, the university finds itself in a role as ‘gatekeeper’ to the profession of law, 
as was the defendant in Andrews v. Law Society o f British Columbia,45 where the 
Charter was found to apply.
In Committee for the Commonwealth o f Canada v. Canada,46 the existence of 
a government actor was not in dispute. The case involved fédéral regulation that 
forbade the distribution of pamphlets at airports. The majority considered it 
important that the function of governmental property be considered. Finding that 
airports were, among other things, a forum for public communications, it was held
42 Post-secondary Education Choice and Excellence Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 36 as amended.
43 Lansbridge University in New Brunswick (an internet-based school) and the University of Phoenix 
in B.C. offer degrees in conjunction with US institutions.
441 don’t mean here to enter into the debate over whether law schools are best conceived as institutions 
for ‘lawyer training’ or for broader purposes; my point is only that, whatever their other functions, law 
schools are in the business of providing a prerequisite to participation in an important and lucrative 
marketplace.
45 Andrews v. Law Society o f  British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
46 Committee for the Commonwealth o f  Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139.
that the Charter applied to protect the distribution of political literature there. The 
majority found that speech should be permitted to the extent that it did not interfere 
with the central functions of the place in question.
Nevertheless, the airport in question in Committee for the Commonwealth o f 
Canada was still public property, and the restrictions imposed were clearly 
governmental. But does the importance of communication at international airports 
diminish if the government establishes, by statute, an independent body that then 
imposes restrictions on its own? Again, Justice La Forest’s judgment in Eldridge, 
excerpted above, seems to anticipate and preclude such an objection.
Conclusions
I confess that I have no clear and easy solutions to the problems of speech regulation 
on campus. I think that the episodes I have reviewed suggest that such rules, formal 
or ad hoc, may be doing more harm than good, though both the harm and good are 
difficult to quantify. My preference is that, whatever ‘time, place and manner’ 
restrictions may be appropriate to ensure that unfettered speech does not interfere 
with the University’s central purpose of instruction and research, these restrictions 
should be set out clearly in advance and should aspire to content-neutrality. This 
suggests requirements o f ‘prescription’ and ‘non-discrimination’, ideas that are, not 
coincidentally, cornerstones of ss. 1, 2, 7, and 15 of the Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms.
Even these simple suggestions are not without their difficulties, as it is precisely 
the content of some speech that can make it potentially disruptive (particularly 
where, as in the case of the Netanyahu speech at Concordia or the anti-abortion 
displays at UBC, those opposed to the content threaten to become violent if it is 
allowed). While permitting the university a good deal of latitude in allocating its 
resources, there should also be some obligation upon the university to take 
reasonably prudent steps to afford a secure forum for unpopular speech.
My central argument is that, wherever the line should be appropriately drawn, 
it should not be entirely up the universities or their student-govemment proxies to 
draw it. There is a gulf between that level of free expression on campus in which 
society has a keen interest in nurturing and the level that a university (or its 
constituents), at any given time, might consider expedient or convenient to permit. 
It is just this sort of divergence of interest that constitutional rights as enshrined in 
the Charter were designed to address.
The university experience is one of the most important phases of the social and 
intellectual development of an informed and active citizen. Society has an 
overwhelming interest in ensuring that it is a time in which our dynamic liberal 
values are fostered and encouraged, not frustrated and stymied by the suppression, 
no matter how well-meaning, of unpopular ideas. The Charter can and should play 
a role in the protection of such interests.
